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Abstract
Research in network science has shown that many naturally occur-
ring and technologically constructed networks are scale free, that means a
power law degree distribution emerges from a growth model in which each
new node attaches to the existing network with a probability proportional
to its number of links (=degree). Little is known about whether the same
principles of local attachment and global properties apply to societies as
well. Empirical evidence from six ethnographic case studies shows that
complex social networks have significantly lower scaling exponents γ ∼ 1
than have been assumed in the past. Apparently humans do not only look
for the most prominent players to play with. Moreover cooperation in hu-
mans is characterized through reciprocity, the tendency to give to those
from whom one has received in the past. Both variables – reciprocity and
the scaling exponent – are negatively correlated (r = −0.767, sig = 0.075).
If we include this effect in simulations of growing networks, degree distri-
butions emerge that are much closer to those empirically observed. While
the proportion of nodes with small degrees decreases drastically as we in-
troduce reciprocity, the scaling exponent is more robust and changes only
when a relatively large proportion of attachment decisions follow this rule.
If social networks are less scale free than previously assumed this has far
reaching implications for policy makers, public health programs and mar-
keting alike.
Keywords: Reciprocity, Scale free networks, Anthropology, Cross cultural
comparison
1 Introduction
Networks are a general model to describe complex forms of organization. A net-
work N = (V,E) is defined as a set of vertices V and a set E of unordered pairs
of distinct elements of V called links of V . Only two networks with V vertices
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have no structure. One is the network of isolates, where no link is realized. The
other is a completely connected graph in which all possible links are present. Re-
search in network science has shown that some structures are much more likely
to occur in the technological and biological world than others [1, 2, 3]. Most
importantly, many known complex networks share one fundamental property:
they are scale free [4]. Each node in a network has k links; k is also called the
degree of a node. Networks are scale free if the non-cumulative degree distribu-
tion P (k) follows a power law: P (k) ∼ 1/kγ with an exponent γ usually between
2 and 3. Scale free networks are dominated by a few hubs, nodes with a very
high degree. In contrast the vast majority of nodes have little links. This struc-
ture proves very efficient in connecting a random pair of nodes with few links.
Moreover scale free networks are robust to random failure [5, 6]. In contrast
attacks targeted at its hubs can relatively easily disconnect them. To explain
the evolution of the scale free typology Baraba´si and Albert have proposed a
model that became known as preferential attachment. In a network that grows
over time, each new node links to the existing structure with a probability that
is proportional to the number of links a node already has [4].
Both preferential attachment and scale free typologies are well established
models in the natural sciences [2, 7, 8, 9]. However, comparatively little is
known about whether the same principles – local exchanges and the emergent
overall typologies – apply to the social world as well. This is especially astonish-
ing since sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists have studied
social organization as social networks for almost a century. Consequently no
network domain is better documented than the social world. Hundreds of em-
pirical studies describe the social fabric in small groups: fraternities, clubs,
organizations, villages and small scale societies [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Addi-
tional survey data shed light on personal networks in some complex societies
such as the United States and most European countries. Despite this wealth of
empirical information we do not know whether, when, and why the social world
follows similar laws. This knowledge would be of enormous value for public
health institutions, politics, consumer research and marketing alike. If societies
are scale free this would make them comparatively easy to control, to influence
and to manipulate alike. A characteristic that would play into the hands of
those in power.
Besides computer connections, the four most often cited examples of power
law distribution in social relationships are citation networks [16], co-authorships
[17], co-acting relations [4], and sexual relationships [18]. It is difficult to treat
any of these relations as an adequate proxy for the larger construct of social
relations in a complex social world. Co-acting, citing and even co-authoring
and sexual intercourse are only relatively selected aspects of the spectrum of
social interactions humans engage in. While combinations of these networks
would make up a better indicator of the latent variable we do not know whether
they are correlated or not. Often they will not be. The best scientist is unlikely
to be the most popular actor at the same time. Not to speak of lovers. Social
activities are not only restricted by talent but also by time. To have many co-
authors produces opportunity costs. Some evidence exists that there is an upper
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Society N dir. links undir. links Recip. γ max γ
Tlaxcala 142 249 7 5.3 1.67 2.19
Herero 41 67 18 34.9 0.77 1.67
Ju/hoansi 73 123 58 48.5 1.05 1.93
Pokot 37 182 149 62.1 -0.25 1.53
Damara 62 74 66 66.1 0.75 1.94
US Fraternity 58 207 106 50.6 0.35 2.02
Table 1: Network statistics of 6 social networks, mostly small-scale societies
from Africa
bound of social networks size that is related to neocortex size [19]. However,
if different social relations are only loosely correlated, or not at all the overall
pattern of the multi-relational network would override its effects and make the
aggregate significantly less scale free than any of its parts.
From the perspective of a social scientist a better proxy for the social struc-
ture may be sets of interactions that link across different societal domains.
Friendship could be an indicator of these relationships. For a more in-depth
understanding the typology of the networks emerging from more encompass-
ing, time consuming, and emotionally laden relationships needs to be analyzed.
Drawing on common sense and empirical observations in different societies we
question the fact that 80 percent of all friends really belong to a happy few.
But this is what a power law in friendship ties translates to.
2 Method and Data
Empirical data on incoming social ties is needed in order to test whether social
networks of the type we are interested in are scale free or not. This restricts
the availability of data sets significantly. Personal network surveys, the most
common and effective way to collect social network data in complex societies,
focus on outgoing ties, the people an individual asks for social support in a given
situation. To overcome these constraints we consider only complete networks
in this comparison. Many of the data sets presented in Table 1 were collected
to understand the significance of social networks and social capital as a coping
strategy to reduce household vulnerability in the extremely insecure ecological,
economic and political environment in Sub-Saharan Africa. All participating
ethnographers have tried to capture the most salient aspects of social relations
in the given society. Most of the studies were conducted in rural villages. The
collection of social network data is often easier in small communities than in
large cities. The social systems are still comparably bounded and their bound-
aries are easier to define. Table 1 gives the summary network statistics for six
different societies.
Tlaxcala is a state in Mexico. Apart from kinship compadrazgo (ritual kin-
ship) is the second most important building block of social order. Compadrazgos
developed out of the godparenthood relations. However compadrazgos cover a
3
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Figure 1: Degree distributions of the 6 social networks: Number of nodes with
k links each, versus k.
much wider range of rites of passage, including first hair cut, graduation, mar-
riage, and inauguration of new possessions. The compadre serves as a ritual
sponsor in these events. Tlaxcala is an industrialized state in which the textile
industry is the most important sector. The data were collected in 1975 by inter-
viewing 142 couples about all the compadrazgos relationships they had engaged
in over the course of their lives [20].
The Herero are pastoralists of central Namibia. Herero social organization
is dominated by the rare double decent kinship system in which an individual
belongs both to the mothers’ and fathers’ unilineal kinship group. The data
analyzed here were collected in 1993 by Ute Stahl (University of Cologne, Ger-
many) and describe support relations among a set of pastoral households.
The Ju/’hoansi are hunter and gatherers of Namibia and Botswana. At
the time of the data collection in the 1970ies the Ju/’hoansi lived in relatively
small and mobile bands. In addition to kinship, exchanges of gifts (hxaro) are
fundamental social relationships. Hxaro relations guarantee access to water
holes and other resources in distinct areas. The data analyzed here describe
these transactions for a set of individuals [21, 22].
The Pokot are pastoralists in North-west Kenya. At the time of the data
collection in 1987 the society was characterized by a strong egalitarian ethos.
The main source of wealth and prestige are cattle. Pokot society is structured
according to age sets and the unilinial kinship system. The elders have a strong
say in most social affairs. The networks analyzed here describe transactions
between households in one Pokot neighborhood [23].
TheDamara are agro-pastoralists of central Namibia. Their social structure
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is largely dominated by exchanges that anthropologists have called demand
sharing. Demand sharing refers to sharing that is initiated through a verbal
demand. In Khoekhoegowab, the language of the Damara people, this demand
is expressed as ”Au te re X!” (Give me some X!). The person being asked is
morally obliged to give some share of what s/he has. A common strategy to
avoid exploitation is to hide the true amount of an asset and to only give a
”fair” share of what is visible to the demanding individual. The social linkages
analyzed here are transactions, including food and other goods needed for daily
survival. They were collected in 2004 by the author and Julia Pauli over a
period of 10 days by interviewing each of the 62 households at the end of the
day about all in- and outgoing transactions that had taken place during the last
24 hours.
The fraternity data record interactions and perceived interactions among
all members of a fraternity at West Virginia college. The data were collected
to analyze the relationship between perception and behavior in social networks
[24].
Table 1 shows that the effective scaling exponent from a least-squares fit
does not reach a value higher than 1.6 in any of the six cases discussed. In
addition to the observed values γ, Table 1 also gives the highest possible scaling
exponent, max γ, for the given size and density of the network. This value was
computed using a Baraba´si-Albert (BA) simulation in which the number of links
was fixed to the mean of the observed network. A program for the simulation
is described in Stauffer et at. [25]. The comparison shows that low γ values
are not an artifact of small sample size. Given samples would have much higher
scaling exponents if preferential attachment is the only rule of choice.
The six corresponding distributions are shown in Figure 1. Tlaxcala is the
only case that shows relatively clear characteristics of a scale free typology.
There is a straightforward explanation to this: the ritual sponsorship (com-
padrazgo) is very costly. Only a very few people can afford to pay for the many
fiestas in which the relationships are celebrated. The other data sets deviate
stronger from a pure power law model. In general, distributions fall into two
categories: scale free like networks in the top row of Figure 1 and random net-
works in the bottom row. In none of the later cases the mode of the distribution
is the smallest degree. Now what distinguishes these networks? If we look at the
fourth column of Table 1 we see one parallel. The networks at the bottom are
networks with high levels of reciprocity. Reciprocity is defined as the fraction
in the overall link distribution of links such that A is tied to B if B is tied to
A, the non-reciprocal links are directed, from A to B or from B to A. Networks
at the top have lower reciprocity. Reciprocity is defined as the percentage of
reciprocal ties in the overall link distribution. These two columns – reciprocity
and γ – show a clear relationship: As reciprocity increases, the scaling expo-
nent decreases (Pearson r = −0.767). The relationship is significant at the level
0.075.
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3 Beyond Preferential Attachment: Reciprocity
Preferential Attachment, linking with central players, is a plausible rule to
explain the emergence of social order among humans. When the physicists
Baraba´si and Albert coined the term in 1999 they were not aware that this
rule had been acknowledged in the social sciences for quite some time. In 1953
Moreno speculated on a general sociological law behind the power law distri-
bution he observed in friendship choices [26] and Merton called the rule in his
sociology of science ”the Matthew effect”: ”For unto every one that hath shall
be given, and he shall have abundance” [27]. Most explicitly De Solla Price
found scientific citations to follow a power law with an exponent in the range
of 2.5-3.0 and called the law behind this formation Cumulative Advantage [28].
Even though the idea that links in networks are not equally distributed has been
debated in the past, Baraba´si and Albert recognized and established the exact
relationship between local attachment (exchange) rules and emerging network
typologies [4]. Over the last years others have refined their model to account
for directed ties and more specific local circumstances [7, 29, 30, 31, 32]. Most
importantly for the social sciences Caldarelli et al. showed that social ties
reconstructed from five email folders indicate the importance of preferential ex-
change [33]. The likelihood of interactions depends on the history of previous
interactions between any two individuals. The authors found their email traffic
was concentrated on a few communication partners while for most addresses
only a few messages were exchanged. They were the first to acknowledge the
importance of memory this debate.
Over the last 20 years a significant body of research in anthropology, eco-
nomics and sociology has shown that humans are not only forward looking
utility maximizers. Homo reciprocans may be a much more adequate model
of man than its forefather homo oeconomicus. The anthropologists Mauss and
Levi-Strauss recognized the importance of reciprocity, the giving and taking
of gifts, goods, and services as one of the primary principles of social orga-
nization [34, 35]. Evolutionary theory recognizes two pathways to cooperation
between organisms: kin-selection and reciprocal altruism. Whereas kin-selection
can explain cooperation between kin, evolutionary theorists, including Darwin,
have long stumbled to explain, why organisms deliver benefits to unrelated
organisms. Trivers’ concept of reciprocal altruism and its game theoretic imple-
mentations by Hamilton and Axelrod are the most convincing solutions to this
problem [36, 37]. The fitness of organisms can be improved through long run
mutual interactions as long-term as the benefits delivered by each are greater
than the costs incurred. The principle is equivalent to the economic principle
of mutual gains in trade. Reciprocity outside the close kinship domain is not
only present with almost all apes but also with vampire bats and other mam-
mals [38]. Most recent intercultural work in experimental economics demon-
strates that fairness and reciprocity may well be universal in humans. In the
Ultimatum Game (UG) player A is given a fixed sum of money and asked to
allocate the money between himself and a player B. The identity of player B
is unknown to him. Player B is then informed about the allocation and has
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the option to accept or to reject the offer. If s/he rejects, both go home with
nothing. The UG was recently played in 15 different small scale societies. In all
societies players allocated appreciable amounts of money to their counterparts
and rejected offers close to zero. A utility maximizing individual would have
done something different. It would have taken whatever was on the table [39].
Largely different research traditions underline the importance of reciprocity as
a fundamental trait of cooperation. But would a network of individuals that
have limited resources to maintain relationships and try to maintain a certain
level of reciprocity look the same as a scale free network? Simulations allow
the testing of what effects reciprocity as a local rule of attachment has on the
network structure as a whole.
4 The Simulation Model
The aim of the model is to test what happens when people in a network start
playing fair instead of only looking after important hubs when choosing new
exchange partners. The simulation starts with a loosely connected Erdo¨s-Re´nyi-
type network in which each node picks two partners at random and gives them
something (degree=2). In the second step it iterates through 10 rounds of
exchanges for each player. The starting condition is different from the seed
usually defined in the BA model. In the BA model the starting configuration
is a small, fully connected graph. Since we want to allow all nodes to choose
partners according to previous exchanges as well, we must define a status quo
before running the actual simulation. The easiest status quo is a random graph.
Throughout all 10 rounds of the simulation we allow all 10,000 vertices to select
partners to give something to according to one of the following two rules: (1)
pick your partner with a probability proportional to its number of incoming links
(preferential attachment) or (2) randomly pick one of the players who gave you
something in the past (reciprocity). The first choice is made with probability
1 − P ; otherwise we take the second choice, randomly at each iteration. The
resulting degree distributions are stored and averaged over 10 simulation runs.
Figure 2 shows the degree distributions with varying probabilities P , that
actors play reciprocal. The two extremes, P = 0 (full BA) and P = 1 (full
reciprocity), are well known: A power law distribution on the one hand and
a Poisson distribution on the other. Effective values of γ between those two
extremes are combinations of the two rules. Adding only small percentages
of the reciprocity rule to the exchange system alters its structure. Table 2
summarizes the results and shows the transformation from a scale free to a
Gaussian typology.
The scaling exponent γ proves to be comparatively robust. The long tail of
the distribution remains even if we add 30 or 40 percent of reciprocity to the
exchange system. The second column gives the value where the first 25 percent
of the distribution ends. This number is called the first quartile. We use it to
describe the behavior at the left end of the distribution. In the full BA model
25 percent of the nodes have 3 links or less. In the simulation this proportion of
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Figure 2: Degree distributions for different models. Results are averages over
10 simulation runs.
0=BA,1=Reciprocity γ First Quartile
0.0 1.98 3
0.1 1.88 4
0.2 1.92 5
0.3 1.68 6
0.4 1.78 7
0.5 1.42 7
0.6 1.36 8
0.7 1.28 8
0.8 1.24 8
0.9 1.15 9
1.0 0.71 9
Table 2: Averaged network statistics of 10 simulation runs (N = 10, 000)
nodes with very few links decreases much faster than the scaling exponent. This
matches the empirical distributions described above. In the true BA model the
mode (maximum) of the distribution is the smallest number of links. Four of
our empirical examples differ from this. The mode is not the smallest value. As
the simulation shows this effect can be caused by reciprocity.
Our observation that many social networks show power law distributions
with exponents lower than 2 matches the simulation. Blending reciprocity and
memory into transactions reproduces networks much better correlated to the
social world than the BA model alone.
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5 Implications
The empirical evidence from six different societies shows marked variations from
fully scale free networks. Drawing on theoretical work in both the social sciences
and evolutionary psychology, we included reciprocity as an additional exchange
rule to account for different network typologies and scaling exponents lower than
2. The implications of our findings are far reaching. Information, opinions, and
viruses spread very differently in networks with different typologies.
Acknowledgment: Dietrich Stauffer taught me how to simulate networks.
He also developed the algorithm used in the simulation. For this assistance, his
careful reading of the manuscript and his support I am very thankful. Hopefully
one day I can reciprocate. I thank Russ Bernard, Michael Bollig, Julia Pauli, Ute
Stahl, Doug White and Polly Wiessner who have contributed data for this com-
parison. Discussions with Patrick Heady, Julia Pauli and Michael Bollig about
the fundamental importance of reciprocity in small scale societies stimulated
this work. Doug White gave valuable comments to improve the manuscript.
The research was funded by the German National Science Foundation (DFG)
as part of the SFB 389 ACACIA.
References
[1] R. Milo, et al., Science 303, 1538 (2004).
[2] M. Newman, SIAM Review 45, 167 (2003).
[3] D. Watts and S. H. Strogatz, Nature, 440 393, (1998).
[4] A. Baraba´si and R. Albert, Science 286, 509 (1999).
[5] R. Albert, H. Jeong and A. Baraba´si, Nature 406, 378 (2000).
[6] R. Cohen, K. Erez, D. ben-Avraham, and S. Havlin, Resilience of the In-
ternet to random breakdown, Physical Review Letters 85, 4626 (2000).
[7] S. N. Dorogovtsev and J. F. F. Mendes, Evolution of networks: from bio-
logical nets to the Internet and WWW (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2003).
[8] D. Lusseau and M. Newman, Proceedings of the Royal Society B 271, 477
(2004).
[9] J. Montoya and V. Sol, Journal of Theoretical Biology 214, 405 (2002).
[10] S. Wasserman and K. Faust, Social network analysis: methods and appli-
cations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994).
[11] L. C. Freeman, The development of social network analysis: a study in the
sociology of science (Empirical Press, Vancouver, BC, 2004).
9
[12] T. Schweizer and D. R. White, Kinship, networks, and exchange (Cam-
bridge, University Press, Cambridge, 1998).
[13] B. Wellman, Science 293, 2031 (2001).
[14] J. Scott, Social network analysis: a handbook (Sage, London, 2000).
[15] D. White and U. Johansen, Network analysis and ethnographic problems:
process models of a Turkish nomad clan (Lexington Books, Lanham, 2004).
[16] S. Redner, The European Physical Journal B 4, 131 (1998).
[17] M. Newman, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 101, 5200 (2004).
[18] F. Liljeros, C. R. Edling, L. A. N. Amaral, E. Stanley and Y. Aberg, Nature
411, 907 (2001).
[19] R. Hill and R. Dunbar, Nature 14, 53 (2003).
[20] D. R. White, M. Schnegg, L. Brudner and H. G. Nutini, Anlisis de re-
des. Aplicaciones en ciencias sociales, J. Gil Mendieta, S. Schmidt, eds.
(Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mexico, Mexico, 2002), p. 41.
[21] P. Wiessner, Politics and history in band societies, E. B. Leacock, R. Lee,
eds. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982), p. 61.
[22] P. Wiessner, Risky Transactions, F. Salter, ed. (Bergham Books, New York,
2002), p. 21.
[23] M. Bollig, Ethnos 65, 341 (2000).
[24] R. Bernard, P. Killowrth and L. Sailer, Social Networks 2, 191 (1980).
[25] D. Stauffer, S. Moss de Oliveira, P.M.C. de Oliveira and J.S. Sa´ Martins,
Biology, Sociology, Geology by Computational Physicists (Elsevier, Amster-
dam, 2006).
[26] J. L. Moreno, Who shall survive? foundations of sociometry, group psy-
chotherapy and sociodrama (Beacon House, New York, 1953).
[27] R. Merton, Science 159, 56 (1968).
[28] D. d. S. Price, Journal of the American Society for Information Science
27, 292 (1976).
[29] J. Pujol, A. Flache, J. Delgado and R. Sanguesa, Journal of Artificial
Societies and Social Simulation 8 (4), paper 12 (2005).
[30] E. M. Jin, M. Girvan and M. E. J. Newman, Physical Review E 64, 046132
(2001).
[31] D. Pennock, G. Flake, S. Lawrence, E. Glover and L. Giles, Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. 99, 5207 (2002).
10
[32] D. Gibson, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 29, 295 (2005).
[33] G. Caldarelli, F. Coccetti, P. De Los Rios, Physical Review E 70, 027102
(2004).
[34] M. Mauss, The gift: forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies
(Routledge, London, 1925).
[35] C. Levi-Strauss, The elementary structures of kinship (Beacon Press,
Boston, 1949).
[36] R. Axelrod and W. Hamilton, Science 211, 1390 (1981).
[37] R. L. Trivers, The Quarterly Review of Biology 46, 35 (1971).
[38] G. Wilkinson, Nature 308, 181 (1984).
[39] J. P. Henrich, Foundations of human sociality: economic experiments and
ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2004).
11
